Differences in Prices and Price Risk across Alternative Marketing Arrangements Used in the Fed Cattle Industry

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Differences in Prices and Price Risk across Alternative Marketing Arrangements Used in the Fed Cattle Industry

PRACTITIONER’S ABSTRACT

Information on typical differences in prices and price risk (as measured by the variances of prices) across marketing arrangements aids fed cattle producers in making choices about methods to use for selling fed cattle to beef packers. This information is also useful for policy discussions on merits and drawbacks of alternative marketing arrangements. As part of the congressionally mandated Livestock and Meat Marketing Study, we investigated differences in prices and price risk for fed cattle cash market and alternative marketing arrangements. The modeling approach, which is similar to a hedonic model, controls for differences in cattle quality and delivery month and accounts for the within- and across-week correlation in prices. The analysis uses a recent data set for the October 2002 through March 2005 time period and includes sale lots of six or more cattle purchased by the 29 largest beef packing plants in the United States. The results indicate that marketing agreements, which are long-term ongoing agreements between fed cattle producers and packers that use formula pricing, offered the best trade-off between price level and price risk for both beef and dairy breed fed cattle. Prices were within $0.01 per pound carcass weight for both beef and dairy breed fed cattle sold under marketing agreements instead of through direct trade, but they were 18% to 20% less volatile. While auction barn prices were higher than all other methods, they were also the most volatile. Forward contracts had the lowest average price and the most volatile prices. The results also indicate that larger and higher quality lots were associated with higher average prices and lower variance of prices.

Keywords: alternative marketing arrangements, fed cattle, prices, price volatility, price risk, hedonic
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INTRODUCTION

In 2003, Congress allocated funds to conduct a broad study of the effects of alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) in the livestock and meat industries. AMAs that result in captive supplies of livestock by packers (i.e., control or ownership of livestock more than 14 days prior to slaughter) have raised particular concerns for many industry participants. The study was completed in early 2007, and the results are being used in discussions about policy changes that are needed to address whether the use of particular methods of procuring livestock by packers has adverse effects on the livestock and meat industries. As part of analyzing the broad range of economic effects of AMAs, we investigated how prices and price risk vary across AMAs (Muth et al. 2007; Muth et al. 2005). In this article, we define price risk to mean the variances of prices across AMAs when controlling for the characteristics of the cattle lot and plant-specific effects. Information on differences in prices and price risk increases transparency in the market and may improve market efficiency. Our study results help explain why different producers and packers use different AMAs.

The primary types of marketing arrangements used for sales of fed cattle to packers can be categorized as cash market arrangements and AMAs. Cash market arrangements include

- auction barn sales, including video and electronic auction sales;
- use of dealers and brokers; and
- direct trade, which is an individual negotiation between a buyer and seller.

In contrast, AMAs include

- forward contracts for the future purchase of a specified quantity of cattle 2 or more weeks in the future,
- marketing agreements for the future purchase of cattle under a long-term ongoing arrangement, and
- packer ownership in which the packer owns the cattle 2 or more weeks prior to slaughter.

In addition to these key types of arrangements, the producer can own a small number of cattle, can custom slaughter, and can market the resulting beef products. Prices under most cash market arrangements are determined immediately through bidding or negotiation. In contrast, prices under forward contracts and marketing agreements and some direct trade transactions are based on some type of formula. Prices under packer ownership are based on an internal transfer pricing method, which is often based on a publicly reported market price (Muth et al. 2007).
In theory, risk-averse cattle producers may be willing to accept lower prices for cattle under an AMA, all else equal, because participation in an AMA ensures market access and reduces a number of uncertainties. Conversely, beef packers may be willing to pay higher prices for cattle under AMAs because AMAs ensure that they will have cattle supplies needed to run the plant at a higher capacity utilization rate and that they will have the necessary quality of cattle to meet buyer requirements for beef products. However, in some cases, the transactions costs involved in negotiating and setting up AMAs, particularly for smaller producers, may prevent market participants from entering into AMAs. In the end, whether prices are higher or lower under AMAs is an empirical question.

The purpose of this article is to analyze differences in prices and price risk across AMAs used for the purchase of fed cattle by beef packers, while controlling for other factors affecting these differences. In contrast to previous studies that use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, the methodology in this article estimates differences in price risk together with price levels and accounts for the fact that prices of transactions within weeks and across nearby weeks are correlated. Analyses that do not account for the correlation within and across weeks may result in misleading inferences. Thus, this research provides suggestions about how transactions price models can be better specified and estimated.

The results of these analyses may help fed cattle producers decide which types of marketing arrangements to use to sell fed cattle to beef packers. Specifically, the results indicate which types of arrangements have offered the highest prices and lowest variance of prices for a given level of quality. While Mandatory Price Reporting (MPR) has greatly increased the transparency of prices in the industry, these data do not provide a means of adjusting for differences in quality across individual transactions or for analyzing price risk across individual transactions. Furthermore, these results contribute to policy discussions regarding the economic benefits of AMAs.

PREVIOUS LITERATURE

Previous studies have analyzed the effects of using different types of marketing arrangements on transactions prices for fed cattle, but, in most cases, they focus on the effect of captive supplies on cash market prices rather than on the differences in prices across types of marketing arrangements (e.g., Elam 1992; Schroeder et al. 1993; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998; Schroeter and Azzam 1999; Schroeter and Azzam 2003). While the empirical research, on balance, suggests an inverse relationship between captive supplies and cash-market prices, establishing a causal link has been elusive (Xia and Sexton 2004). According to Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998), removing a share of cattle from the cash market affects both supply and demand in the cash market. In a competitive market, the effect on price is ambiguous, because it depends on the relative magnitude of the shifts, which is related to the functional forms of demand and supply.

Previous studies that have examined differences in prices across types of marketing arrangements used for fed cattle include Williams et al. (1996) and Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998). These models are akin to hedonic pricing models in the sense that the price of the product (fed cattle) is modeled as a function of its attributes to determine the implicit prices of various quality products (Rosen 1974). However, in addition to measures of product attributes,
binary variables representing the type of marketing arrangement were also included in the models. Earlier hedonic models of fed cattle prices did not include variables representing the range of marketing arrangements used (e.g., Ward [1992] and Schroeder [1997]) but did provide guidance on the types of quality measures or other variables that are important to explain differences in fed cattle prices.

The model in Williams et al. (1996) expresses the average delivered liveweight cost of fed cattle as a function of the type of marketing arrangement, lot characteristics (e.g., number of head and yield grade), plant characteristics (e.g., capacity), market structure variables (e.g., regional Herfindahl index), quarterly dummy variables, and output price for beef. The analysis was conducted as part of the 1996 congressionally mandated study of market concentration in the meat packing industry. The data set included 23 million head of cattle sold in 182,000 sale lots by 43 plants from April 5, 1992, through April 3, 1993. Only lots with 35 head or more were included in the data set. Results of OLS regression indicated that relative to cash market transactions, prices for cattle sold through forward contracts and transferred under packer ownership were lower, and prices for cattle sold through marketing agreements were higher. However, the differences in prices were at most $0.02 per pound liveweight and were typically much less than $0.01 per pound. The results were similar when the model was re-estimated separately for three regions of the country (states in the High Plains, West, and Midwest).

The model in Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) was estimated using the same data set as Williams et al. (1996) but included 16.5 million cattle sold in 140,000 sale lots by 28 plants. The Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) model specified the purchase price for cattle on a carcass weight basis as a function of type of marketing arrangement, reported market prices (e.g., boxed beef cut out value and the live cattle futures price), lot characteristics (e.g., weight, number of head, and yield grade), trend variables, plant binary variables, and other variables. Results of OLS regression indicated that relative to cash market transactions, carcass weight prices for fed cattle were slightly higher for marketing agreement cattle ($0.10 per cwt), much lower for forward contract cattle ($3.16 per cwt), but not significantly different for packer-fed cattle.

Previous analyses assumed prices were (conditionally) uncorrelated across transactions and overlooked the possible correlation of prices within weeks and across nearby weeks; thus, the inferences they drew may be misleading. In addition, smaller size lots were not included in the data sets used for the previous analyses, which likely excluded a substantial number of cash market transactions, and hence may have reduced the representativeness of the results. The model developed and estimated in the following sections accounts for the within-week and across-week correlation of prices, includes all lots of six or more cattle, differentiates between auction sales and other types of cash market sales, and uses a recent data set collected for the 2007 Grain Inspection, Packer and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) Livestock and Meat Marketing Study. In addition to taking into account the correlation of prices, the results of modeling the error structure provide useful information about the differences in price risk across marketing arrangements.

**FED CATTLE TRANSACTIONS DATA**

The data used for the analyses represent all fed cattle purchase transactions for 29 of the largest beef packing plants in the United States from October 2002 through March 2005. These 29
plants are owned by 10 individual companies with most but not all companies owning multiple 
plants. The data were collected by RTI International under contract with GIPSA in spring 2006. 
Because of the highly confidential nature of the data, the data were collected and maintained 
under the provisions of the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act 
(CIPSEA) of 2002. Data collected under CIPSEA can be used only for statistical analysis 
purposes and cannot be used for investigations. Furthermore, results of analyses cannot reveal 
plant- or company-specific information. We describe the contents of the data set and frequency 
of AMA use below.

Contents of the Data Set

The data set includes 591,000 lots of beef and dairy breed fed cattle averaging 100 cattle per lot 
for a total of 58 million head of cattle. By region, the data set comprises following:

- Cornbelt/Northeast region (IA, IL, MI, MN, PA, WI): 5 plants that bought 4.5 million 
  head of cattle in 98,000 lots,
- High Plains region (CO, KS, NE, TX): 17 plants that bought 48.5 million head of 
  cattle in 430,000 lots,
- West region (AZ, CA, ID, UT, WA): 7 plants that bought 5.1 million head of cattle in 
  66,000 lots.

The volume of cattle in the data set represents approximately 85% of the fed cattle slaughtered in 
the United States during the October 2002 through March 2005 time period based on U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) data (USDA/National Agriculture Statistics Service [NASS] 
various years). The data represent an interesting time period in the fed cattle industry because of 
the disruptions in the market that occurred first in May 2003, when the first discovery of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was made in Canada, and the border was closed to live cattle 
and beef imports into the United States. Then in December 2003, the first discovery of BSE was 
made in the United States, and exports of beef from the United States were banned, and some 
consumers decreased their beef consumption. Thus, considerable variation occurs in the baseline 
market conditions within this data set, including periods of relatively low and relatively high 
cattle supplies.

The variables in the data set include location of the plant, transaction dates, seller information, 
number of cattle in the lot, costs of the lot, weight measures (e.g., liveweight and carcass 
weight), characteristics of the cattle sold (quality grade, yield grade, and other quality measures), 
and characteristics of the marketing arrangement used. Fed cattle purchase lots typically range 
from 10 to 200 cattle per lot. Within an individual lot, the quality and characteristics of cattle 
may vary substantially depending on breed, distribution of steers versus heifers, whether any 
cattle are culled cows or bulls, weight range, quality grade, and yield grade. Thus, to analyze 
differences in transactions prices, it is necessary to adjust for differences in the composition and 
quality of the lot.

The fed cattle prices in the data set represent the total cost to the packer for each lot of cattle. The 
total cost of a lot includes the cost of the cattle in the lot, shipping costs (which may be paid by
the packer or by the producer), sales commission costs, miscellaneous costs (e.g., feed), and price adjustments for quality. We used the per-lot total cost to compute the carcass weight price per pound by dividing the total cost by the total carcass weight of each lot. Because of substantial variation in reporting of costs by packers, we used the total costs of the lot rather than the cattle cost to compute averages. Cattle cost typically comprises 97% to 99% of the total cost of the lot. We include plant-level binary variables in the analysis to account for differences in the accounting and reporting of the total cost of each lot across companies in the data set. To eliminate odd lots that are not representative of typical transactions, we excluded transactions with prices below $0.86 and above $1.98 per pound carcass weight. These values were determined by taking $0.10 below the minimum and $0.10 above the maximum price ranges reported by MPR over the time period of the data. This data preparation step eliminated approximately 0.03% of the transactions in the data set.

**Frequency of Marketing Arrangement Use for Fed Cattle**

Table 1 provides a summary of the numbers of lots and transactions for each of the major types of marketing arrangements. For confidentiality reasons, auction barn sales are combined with the use of brokers and dealers, and the packer ownership category is combined with other miscellaneous types. Cash market transactions represent 61.7% of the head sold over the October 2002 through March 2005 time period. Marketing agreements were the primary AMA, representing 28.8% of the head sold. Packer ownership, which is combined with the miscellaneous other category, represents less than 5% of the head sold. Based on the differences in the percentages of lots versus head, auction sale lots tended to be smaller than average, and marketing agreement and forward contract lots tended to be somewhat larger than average.

**MODEL DEVELOPMENT**

We used a parsimonious reduced-form model to analyze how purchase prices for fed cattle vary among different types of marketing arrangements for cattle of similar quality. The intention of the model is to provide information on the association between use of marketing arrangements and fed cattle prices. However, because of the reduced-form nature of the model, we are not able to draw conclusions regarding a possible causality relationship.

The complete model for estimating price differences and modeling the structure of the error term for capturing differences in price risk and the interdependencies in the data is specified as follows:

\[
PRICE_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{AMA_i} + \beta_2 CATTLE_{CH_i} + \beta_3 d_{beefcattle_i} \times D_{AMA_i} + \beta_4 D_{PLANT_i} + \beta_5 D_{MONTH_i} + u_{it}
\]

\[
u_{it} = \epsilon_{it},
\]

\[
Cov(\nu_t, \nu_s) = \begin{cases} 
\sigma_v^2, & \text{if } t = s \\
\rho \sigma_v^2, & \text{if } |t - s| = 1, \\
0, & \text{if } |t - s| > 1
\end{cases}
\]
and

\[
\text{Var}(u_{it}) = \exp(\delta_0 + \delta_1 D\_AMA_{it} + \delta_2 \text{CATTLE\_CH}_{it} + \\
+ \delta_3 d\_beefcattle_{it} \times D\_AMA_{it} + \delta_4 D\_MONTH_t + \xi_{it}).
\]  

(4)

where \( t = 1, \ldots, T \) indexes kill week for each lot of fed cattle, and \( i = 1, \ldots, I_t \) indexes transactions (i.e., fed cattle lots purchased by packers).

In Equation (1), \( \text{PRICE}_{it} \) is the transactions price for each lot on a per-pound carcass weight basis, \( \beta \) are parameters to estimate, and \( u_{it} \) is a random error term. In addition, \( D\_AMA_{it} \) is a vector of binary variables that indicates the type of marketing arrangement used for purchase of the lot, including direct trade (\( d\_direct \)) (as the base group), auction barns (\( d\_auction \)), forward contracts (\( d\_forward \)), packer owned and other arrangements (\( d\_packer \)), and marketing agreements (\( d\_marketing \)). \( \text{CATTLE\_CH}_{it} \) is a vector of cattle characteristics, including whether the fed cattle are a beef or dairy breed (\( d\_beefcattle \)), the number of head in the lot (number of head), the percentage of Yield Grade 4 or 5 cattle in the lot (\( \text{yg45\_pct} \)), the percentage of cattle with Quality Grade of Prime or Choice in the lot (\( \text{primechoice\_pct} \)), the percentage of cattle that were classified as heavyweight or lightweight in the lot according to the definition of heavyweight or lightweight used by each individual packer (\( \text{outweight\_pct} \)), and the percentage of cattle that were eligible for a branded or a certification program in the lot (\( \text{branded\_pct} \)). All of the characteristics variables measure different aspects of quality of the lot of fed cattle. We also include the interaction term of \( d\_beefcattle \) and \( D\_AMA \) so that the price premium/discount associated with each marketing arrangement is allowed to be different for beef cattle and dairy cattle (fed dairy steers).

Finally, we also included 28 plant binary variables (\( D\_PLANT \)) to control for the plant-level unobserved fixed effects, such as location, installed capital equipment, and type of accounting system, and 29 binary variables that indicate the month in which the cattle were killed (\( D\_MONTH \)). The monthly binary variables control for differences in market conditions, seasonality, trends, and other possible unobserved effects related to each month. In particular, these monthly binary variables help control for the effect of the market disruptions that occurred as a result of the BSE discoveries in Canada and the United States during this period.5

Table 2 provides the definitions, means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums of the variables included in the model, with the exception of the plant and monthly binary variables.

Equation (2) decomposes the error term \( u_{it} \) into two components: a transaction-specific random error term, \( \epsilon_{it} \), and an unobserved weekly effect, \( v_t \), which is constant for all transactions with delivery date in week \( t \). We assume \( v_t \) and \( \epsilon_{it} \) are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and uncorrelated with each other. We separately model the weekly effect in the error term because the U.S. fed cattle market is generally a weekly market (i.e., packers arrange their procurement and production activities week by week).

Both the covariance in Equation (3) and the variance in Equation (4) are conditional on the explanatory variables in Equation (1). The structure of Equations (3) and (4) is intended to capture two potential features of the high-frequency data we used. First, transactions prices (conditional on the explanatory variables) may be correlated within the same week and across
neighboring weeks, even though we have controlled for the monthly fixed effects. Second, the
variance of transactions prices (conditional on the explanatory variables) may vary over time, by
AMA choice, or by some other explanatory variables. That is, we may have a heteroskedasticity
problem. Equation (3) assumes that the conditional covariance of prices between any two
transactions delivered in the same week is $\sigma^2_v$, the conditional covariance of prices between two
transactions delivered in neighboring weeks is $\rho \sigma^2_v$, and the conditional covariance of
transactions prices is zero otherwise. Equation (4) assumes that the variance of transactions
prices depends on the choice of marketing arrangement, cattle characteristics, and delivery
month. If the correlation within and across weeks or heteroskedasticity exists but we failed to
model them, our inferences would be invalid.

The parameters in Equation (4) are also of interest because they indicate how price variance is
correlated with the explanatory variables and how price variance is used as a measure of price
risk in our model. Equation (4) defines what we mean by price risk (i.e., the difference between
the observed transactions price and the predicted transactions price from the mean equation). A
large number of variables in Equation (1) explain the systematic variation in transactions prices
across lots. The unexplained variation in price is modeled in Equation (4) and can be associated
with characteristics of each transaction, including the marketing method. This measure of risk is
short term and similar to basis risk.

In the model described by Equations (1) through (4) we are particularly interested in the
parameters $\beta_1$, $\beta_3$, $\delta_1$, and $\delta_3$. The $\beta_1$ and $\beta_3$ parameters indicate the average price differences
associated with AMAs, holding other explanatory variables fixed. The $\delta_1$ and $\delta_3$ parameters
indicate the differences in price variance associated with AMAs, holding $CATTLE\_CH$ and
$D\_MONTH$ fixed.

Prior to estimating Equation (1), we tested the following three null hypotheses for the existence
of heteroskedasticity and/or correlation in the error term:

Hypothesis 1:

$$H_0: \delta_1 = \delta_2 = \delta_3 = \delta_4 = 0 \quad \text{vs.} \quad H_1: H_0 \text{ not true}$$

Hypothesis 2:

$$H_0: \sigma^2_v = 0 \quad \text{vs.} \quad H_1: \sigma^2_v > 0$$

Hypothesis 3:

$$H_0: \rho \sigma^2_v = 0 \quad \text{vs.} \quad H_1: \rho \sigma^2_v > 0.$$ 

If the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 1 is not rejected, we would not have to model
heteroskedasticity. If the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 2 is not rejected, we would not have to
model the price correlation among transactions within the same week. If the null hypothesis for
Hypothesis 3 is not rejected, we would not have to model the price correlation between
neighboring weeks. However, Wald tests reject each of the three hypotheses at the 1% significance level. The estimates of $\sigma_v^2$ and $\rho$ are reported at the bottom of Table 3. The results of these tests support modeling both heteroskedasticity and correlation in the error term. This dependence in the error terms has not been considered in previous research using transactions prices and suggests the statistical significance of some of those previous findings may be overstated.

**ESTIMATION RESULTS**

Equation (1) was estimated using OLS. The estimates for the parameters are reported in the second column of Table 3, with standard errors in parentheses. In addition, the estimates for the heteroskedasticity model, the $\delta$s, are reported in the third column of Table 3. The standard errors are consistent with the error structure in Equations (2) through (4). We did not use the more efficient feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). FGLS is computationally not feasible because of the size of the data set and the complexity of the error structure. We describe the results in more detail below.

**Price Difference Equation Results**

The results of estimation suggest that, while holding other explanatory variables fixed, (1) beef breed direct trade cattle were priced $0.027 per pound higher than dairy breed direct trade cattle, (2) cattle with higher yield grades or higher quality grades received a higher average price, (3) a 1% increase in branded cattle in a lot was associated with a $0.027 per pound higher average price, and (4) the prices of lightweight or heavyweight cattle were discounted. In addition, average prices were slightly higher for larger cattle lots. These differences are relative to an average price of $1.31 per pound carcass weight for the transactions in the data set and indicate the average magnitude of premiums and discounts being paid to producers.

Tables 4 and 5 summarize the estimated average price differences among AMAs for beef cattle and dairy cattle. Standard errors were estimated as described by Equations (2) through (4). All the differences were individually significant at the 5% level, based on Wald tests. The average prices were closest among the direct trade, marketing agreement, and packer-owned transactions, with the estimated differences ranging from $0.001 to $0.012 per pound carcass weight. The auction barn transactions price was estimated to be about $0.109 higher for beef breed cattle and $0.017 higher for dairy breed cattle than for the corresponding direct trade cattle, although both direct trade and auctions are cash market procurement methods. Transactions prices associated with forward contract transactions were the lowest among all the procurement methods. This result may suggest that farmers who choose forward contracts were willing to give up some revenue to secure market access and fix the price at least 2 weeks before delivery.

The result that auction barn prices were the highest and forward contract prices were the lowest could be due, in part, to the unique time period of the analysis, including the stage of the cattle cycle and the closure of the border with Canada after the discovery of BSE in May 2003. Our model compares the prices among procurement methods for the cattle delivered in the same month but does not control for the pricing dates related to individual transactions. Transactions prices are correlated with the expectation of market conditions at the delivery date based on the information available at the pricing date. Pricing dates and delivery dates systematically differed.
among procurement methods. According to the portion of the data for which pricing dates were available (approximately 40% of the records), on average, forward contract cattle were priced 12 days ahead of delivery date, direct trade cattle were priced 6 days ahead, and auction barn cattle were priced only 2 days ahead of the kill date. Consider a forward contract lot and an auction barn lot that are delivered at the same time. If a positive market shock (e.g., the closure of the border with Canada) occurred before the pricing time of auction barn cattle but was not expected at the time when forward contract cattle were priced, then forward contract cattle would be priced lower than auction barn cattle because of the unexpected random market shock. If the time period represented in the data were long enough, this would not bias the estimation results because positive shocks should be offset by negative shocks in the long run. However, this may not be true in this case because the represented time period is relatively short. That is, if the unexpected market shock were systematically positive during our represented period, failing to control for market expectations at the pricing date would bias the estimates of price differences among procurement methods. However, we believe the effect of this bias is limited, because the largest average pricing date difference among procurement methods is a maximum of 12 days. To investigate the possible bias in the results due to the unique time period of analysis, we examined the average 2-week price difference in the Nebraska cash market for steers. We found that this difference was both economically and statistically insignificant (the mean value of the difference is $0.0018 per pound dressed weight, and the P value of the t-test is 0.78). Therefore, we expect the bias, if it exists, is small.

The primary findings of the price difference model is that marketing agreement, packer-owned, and negotiated cash cattle are all priced at similar levels. While dairy breed fed cattle sold under a marketing agreement are discounted slightly relative to direct trade, the opposite occurs for beef breed fed cattle. Although price differences may be a reason for using particular AMAs, other reasons, such as allowing for market access, also affect the decision to use AMAs.

Heteroskedasticity Equation Results

The primary conclusions regarding price risk from the estimated coefficients in the last column of Table 3 indicate that compared with direct trade the price variances were much higher for auction barn transactions and forward contracts and lower for packer-owned and marketing agreement transactions, holding cattle characteristics (variable \textit{CATTLE\_CH}) and month of sale (variable \textit{D\_MONTH}) fixed. In comparing these coefficients, variances of prices clearly do not represent all types of risk faced by market participants. In particular, producers using forward contracts may face higher price risk if market conditions change after negotiating the contract, but they may also face lower revenue risk, they may have secured market access, and they may have the ability to obtain better financing terms with lenders. Other parameter estimates suggest that price variances were (1) lower for fed beef cattle than fed dairy cattle, (2) lower for cattle that are eligible for a branded and certification program, (3) lower for cattle of higher yield grade (i.e., a lower yield grade number) and quality grade, (4) lower for cattle within the regular weight range, and (5) lower for cattle sold in large lots. To summarize, cattle that have desirable characteristics obtained not only higher average prices but also secured lower price risk.

The estimated differences (percentage higher or lower) in price variance among marketing arrangements for fed beef cattle and for fed dairy cattle are reported in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. All the difference estimates were individually significant at the 5% level based on
Wald tests. Among the five marketing arrangement categories, auction barn transactions were associated with the highest average price but also the highest price risk, even after accounting for systematic factors such as quality and month. Thus, it appears that selling through auction barns should appeal more to less risk-averse cattle feeders. In addition, prices under forward contracts were more risky than direct trade or marketing agreements because prices were lower and price risk was higher. In comparing auction barn transactions to forward contracts, the average price difference ($0.06 per pound for beef cattle and $0.16 per pound for fed dairy cattle) could be considered a risk premium to compensate feeders who sell their cattle in auction barns for bearing more price risk (46% higher variance for beef cattle and 43% higher variance for fed dairy cattle) and for assuming more market access risk. Packer-owned fed dairy cattle had slightly lower average prices ($0.012 per pound carcass weight) and lower price variance (20% lower) than direct trade while packer-owned fed beef cattle had slightly higher average prices ($0.001 per pound carcass weight) and lower price variance (10% lower) than direct trade. This result is consistent with the fact that internal transfer prices for packer-owned cattle usually are based on a reported average cash market price. Transactions through marketing agreements are associated with lower price risk (18% lower variance for fed beef cattle and 27% lower for fed dairy cattle) than those through direct trade. Given that average prices for marketing agreement cattle and direct trade cattle are very similar and that marketing agreements help secure market access while direct trade does not, it appears that a risk-averse feeder has less incentive to use direct trade when marketing agreements are available. However, marketing agreements require a strong bilateral relationship between feeder and packer and might not be available for all feeders.

From a methodological standpoint, the correlation of transactions prices within the week and across weeks is important. The estimates of $\sigma^2$ and $\rho$ in Equation 3 are individually significant at the 1% significance level. The estimated average correlations of prices within the week and across weeks are 16% and 4.3% respectively. Thus, ignoring these correlations may result in higher levels of significance of the estimated model parameters; thus, inferences may be misleading.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

Fed cattle producers and beef packers may choose among several cash and AMAs to conduct transactions. Factors affecting their choices include whether prices are on average higher, lower, or more or less volatile for each type of arrangement. We conducted an econometric analysis of the relationship between fed cattle transactions prices and use of marketing arrangements, while controlling for differences in cattle quality and delivery month and accounting for the within-week and across-nearby-week correlation in prices. The analysis used a recent data set for the October 2002 through March 2005 time period and included sales lots of six or more cattle purchased by the 29 largest beef packing plants in the United States.

The results indicate that relative to direct trade, which is the most frequently used marketing arrangement for fed cattle, prices for fed cattle sold through auctions were higher, but also had substantially higher price risk. Prices for cattle sold under forward contracts or marketing arrangements or cattle transferred under packer ownership were all lower than cattle for direct trade, but only prices under forward contracts were more volatile. The results for forward contracts were likely because of the time period of the analysis, in which fed cattle prices were
trending upward, and because prices under forward contracts are set earlier than for the other types of arrangements. Marketing agreements appeared to provide the best trade-off between price level and price risk compared with direct trade, because prices were within $0.01 per pound carcass weight for both beef and dairy breed fed cattle but were 18% to 20% less volatile.

The results also indicated that larger and higher quality lots were associated with higher average prices and lower variances of prices. Packers are willing to pay more for larger lots because they reduce their transactions costs and improve scheduling of their operations. The quality measures included in the analysis included the percentage of cattle in Yield Grade 4 or 5, in Choice or Prime Quality Grade, outside of the desired weight range, and eligible for product branding. All measures were statistically significant, indicating that packers pay more for better quality cattle and have less variation in prices while holding fixed the type of marketing arrangement used and the month of purchase.

In short, the results show that fed cattle transactions prices have economically meaningful differences across marketing methods. Furthermore, these different marketing methods have different risk profiles. Producers and packers will choose different marketing methods to take advantage of the differences in price levels and to reduce risks.

Further analyses of these data are investigating more directly the relationship between the use of AMAs, which would typically be considered captive supply arrangements, and cash market prices (Muth et al. 2007). In particular, the questions of interest include whether individual packers bid less aggressively in the cash market when they have a higher proportion of their supplies precommitted under AMAs and whether a higher use of AMAs across the industry is associated with reduced cash market prices. Additional analyses are investigating the direct relationship between fed cattle quality and the use of different types of marketing arrangements or valuation methods (i.e., liveweight, carcass weight with a grid, and carcass weight without a grid) (Muth et al. 2007). In this case, the question of interest is whether packers are using AMAs to ensure higher and more consistent quality of fed cattle purchases.

REFERENCES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purchase Method</th>
<th>No. of Lots</th>
<th>% of Lots</th>
<th>No. of Head</th>
<th>% of Head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auction barns, dealers, and brokers</td>
<td>44,237</td>
<td>7.50%</td>
<td>2,426,488</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct trade</td>
<td>338,254</td>
<td>57.20%</td>
<td>33,396,016</td>
<td>57.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward contract</td>
<td>23,047</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
<td>2,626,217</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing agreement</td>
<td>158,705</td>
<td>26.80%</td>
<td>16,748,315</td>
<td>28.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packer fed/owned, other, or missing</td>
<td>27,167</td>
<td>4.60%</td>
<td>2,869,405</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>591,410</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,066,440</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Price Difference Model for Fed Cattle Purchase Transactions, October 2002–March 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>price</td>
<td>Transactions price in dollar per pound carcass weight</td>
<td>1.3100</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_direct</td>
<td>Direct trade purchase (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>0.5800</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_auction</td>
<td>Auction purchase (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_forward</td>
<td>Forward contract purchase (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>0.0400</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_packer</td>
<td>Packer-owned procurement (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_marketing</td>
<td>Marketing agreement procurement (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>0.2800</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_beefcattle</td>
<td>Mostly beef breed cattle in the lot (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>0.7800</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numberofhead</td>
<td>Number of head in the lot (100s)</td>
<td>0.9900</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>15.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yg45_pct</td>
<td>% Yield Grade 4 or 5 in the lot</td>
<td>0.0830</td>
<td>0.0980</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primechoice_pct</td>
<td>% Prime or Choice in the lot</td>
<td>0.6400</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overweight_pct</td>
<td>% heavyweight or lightweight cattle in the lot</td>
<td>0.3300</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>branded_pct</td>
<td>% cattle eligible for branded or certification program in the lot</td>
<td>0.1900</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D = Results suppressed to maintain confidentiality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Price Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
<th>Log(var(u)) Coefficient (Std. Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d_auction</td>
<td>0.016 (0.0011)</td>
<td>0.92 (0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_forward</td>
<td>-0.047 (0.0008)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_packer</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.0017)</td>
<td>-0.32 (0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_ma</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.0005)</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_beefcattle</td>
<td>0.027 (0.0003)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_beefcattle*d_auction</td>
<td>0.093 (0.0016)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_beefcattle*d_forward</td>
<td>-0.000017 (0.0008)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_beefcattle*d_packer</td>
<td>0.013 (0.0018)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_beefcattle*d_ma</td>
<td>0.012 (0.00043)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numberofhead</td>
<td>0.0049 (0.0001)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.0035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yg45_pct</td>
<td>-0.073 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.70 (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primechoice_pct</td>
<td>0.062 (0.0005)</td>
<td>-0.23 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outweight_pct</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.0005)</td>
<td>0.31 (0.0092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>branded_pct</td>
<td>0.027 (0.0006)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma^2_v)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\rho)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other variables(^b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of observations (lots) 571,608 571,608
R\(^2\) 0.7744 0.1260

\(^a\) Coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level. All other variables are significant at the 5% level.
\(^b\) The “other variables” include an intercept, monthly binary variables, and plant binary variables.
### Table 4. Estimated Average Price Differences among AMAs for Beef Breed Fed Cattle Purchase Transactions, October 2002–March 2005 (Cents per Pound Carcass Weight)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marketing Arrangement</th>
<th>Auction</th>
<th>Direct Trade and Dealer/Broker</th>
<th>Forward Contract</th>
<th>Marketing Agreement</th>
<th>Packer Owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auction</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct trade and dealer/broker</td>
<td>−10.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>−0.6</td>
<td>−0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward contract</td>
<td>−15.6</td>
<td>−4.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−5.3</td>
<td>−4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing agreement</td>
<td>−10.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packer owned</td>
<td>−10.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>−0.5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5. Estimated Average Price Differences among AMAs for Dairy Breed Fed Cattle Purchase Transactions, October 2002–March 2005 (Cents per Pound Carcass Weight)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marketing Arrangement</th>
<th>Auction</th>
<th>Direct Trade and Dealer/Broker</th>
<th>Forward Contract</th>
<th>Marketing Agreement</th>
<th>Packer Owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auction</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct trade and dealer/broker</td>
<td>−1.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward contract</td>
<td>−6.3</td>
<td>−4.7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−4.1</td>
<td>−3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing agreement</td>
<td>−2.2</td>
<td>−0.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packer owned</td>
<td>−2.8</td>
<td>−1.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>−0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6. Estimated Price Variance Differences (Percentage Higher or Lower) among Marketing Arrangements Used for Purchasing Fed Beef Cattle, October 2002–March 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marketing Arrangement</th>
<th>Auction</th>
<th>Direct Trade and Dealer/Broker</th>
<th>Forward Contract</th>
<th>Marketing Agreement</th>
<th>Packer Owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auction</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>331%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>426%</td>
<td>376%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct trade and dealer/broker</td>
<td>−77%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>−66%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward contract</td>
<td>−32%</td>
<td>194%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>260%</td>
<td>225%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing agreement</td>
<td>−81%</td>
<td>−18%</td>
<td>−72%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>−10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packer owned</td>
<td>−79%</td>
<td>−10%</td>
<td>−69%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The differences are computed as the price variance of each AMA listed in the left column divided by the price variance of each AMA listed in the top row minus one.

### Table 7. Estimated Price Variance Differences (Percentage Higher or Lower) among Marketing Arrangements Used for Purchasing Dairy Breed Fed Cattle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marketing Arrangement</th>
<th>Auction</th>
<th>Direct Trade and Dealer/Broker</th>
<th>Forward Contract</th>
<th>Marketing Agreement</th>
<th>Packer Owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auction</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>151%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>213%</td>
<td>246%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct trade and dealer/broker</td>
<td>−60%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>−43%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward contract</td>
<td>−30%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>118%</td>
<td>141%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing agreement</td>
<td>−68%</td>
<td>−20%</td>
<td>−54%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packer owned</td>
<td>−71%</td>
<td>−27%</td>
<td>−59%</td>
<td>−10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The differences are computed as the price variance of each AMA listed in the left column divided by the price variance of each AMA listed in the top row minus one.
ENDNOTES

1 An alternative definition of price risk could be based on the likelihood of receiving a lower price for fed cattle sold under particular marketing arrangements as compared with the price that could have been received using a different marketing arrangement. However, it is infeasible to determine the relevant marketing arrangement for making the comparison on every transaction.

2 The text of the public law can be found at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oss/CIPSEA.pdf.

3 Smaller lots of cattle are typically off-quality cattle that are not quality graded.

4 Transactions through dealers or brokers are combined with the transactions through direct trade because they account for a very small fraction of the total transactions (less than 1%) and are another type of cash market purchase.

5 Note that this specification differs from Ward, Koontz, and Schroeter (1998) in that it does not include the set of market prices—boxed beef prices, beef by-product prices, live cattle futures prices, and lagged cash market prices. Instead, we include monthly dummy variables to account for current market conditions and thus avoid multicollinearity associated with including these variables.

6 The Wald test procedure and results are available upon request.

7 Estimation of the model using FGLS would require inverting a 591,410 by 591,410 matrix.

8 Note that the pricing date is different from the date on which the contract was signed. For example, forward contracts are typically signed a few months prior to slaughter, but prices may be set according to a formula closer to the slaughter date and possibly after the slaughter data, if valuation is based on a carcass weight using a grid.